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Abstract After a brief introduction of a cultural psychological perspective, this paper turns
to the concept of self. The paper proposes to conceive of that reality to which the concepts
of self refer as a narrative, employing especially autobiographies and other ego-documents
in empirical exploration. After discussing some psychological theories about “self,” the
paper points out that they may well be applied in research on personal religiosity.
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Introduction: A cultural psychological perspective
It is not easy to state in only a few words that which the title of this paper refers. I shall
have only the possibility to make some very general statements, hopefully not too
sweepingly formulated, and to articulate only a few more precise observations on a couple
of theories on a psychological construct sometimes called “the self,” but more correctly
hinted at by not employing the definite article “the,” so referred to by only the term “self”
(see below). All of this may sound clumsy, and perhaps it is. The truth is, however, that we
are not dealing here with anything that would be conceptually clear: after more than a
century of research and theorizing, psychologists still can’t tell what that is: self. Nor can
they satisfyingly explain what “mental health” is. (And both “religion” and “culture” are
not concepts to be defined by psychologists, we have to leave that to other disciplines.)
Most concepts in psychology are not clear, and whenever they are clearly formulated, it can
usually be pointed out that they fall short of capturing the empirical reality they are aiming
at. (Although relevant here, I shall not go into the difficult issue of concepts, and of
language in general, constituting reality, cf., e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980.) Trying to be
faithful to the central topic of our conference, I shall try to come up with some observations
that hopefully will prove to be worthwhile to practitioners in the realm of counseling and
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psychotherapy, although these observations will, in the realm of psychology, never lead to
simple recipes.
One of the reasons that the very object of the science called psychology if it is a science
at all is so difficult to conceptualize, is that it is evasive. The psychic realm is
fundamentally different from the realm of the natural science, whose object is not easy to
conceptualize either, by the way. The psychic realm is not constituted of objects like the
ones we handle with our hands in ordinary daily life. A common psychic phenomenon like
a dream is not something you can touch or investigate like a piece of wood or like a stone;
it is not even an entity like the human body including the human brain. Psychic reality,
comprised of phenomena like attention, memory, thought, feeling, desire, anxiety, self
concept, etc. and characterized by intentionality, has given rise to a multitude of approaches
and of efforts of conceptualization. Great theoreticians among the founding fathers of
psychology have come up with radically different models of the human person or of the
human mind, of the psyche, or what way ever they preferred to call their object of study.
What we do know, however, is that the psychic realm is constituted, regulated and
maintained by culture understood in the broadest sense: without culture, no new born baby
would survive, without culture, the human being is inconceivable. To culture also belong
the varieties of religious and spiritual traditions we witness in past and present. Cultural
psychology, therefore, stresses that cultural patterns of acting, thinking and experiencing are
created, adopted and promulgated by a number of individuals jointly. Such patterns are
supra-individual (social) rather than individual, and they are artefactual rather than natural.
Thus, psychological phenomena are cultural insofar as they are social artifacts, i.e., insofar
as their content, mode of operation and dynamic relationships are a) socially created and
shared by a number of individuals, and b) integrated with other social artifacts (Ratner
2002, p. 9). Conversion, e.g., is a phenomenon found within certain religions, having a
different meaning within different subgroups of such religions, being the result of certain
patterns of religious practice, in their turn related to certain religious doctrines and rituals
(Belzen 1999). In cultural psychology usually the meaning of some form of action (or
thought or experience) is central, not the action as such (which could be and in fact often
is studied by other social and human sciences too). Culture, also cultural practices, is being
conceived of as symbolic: it is considered to do more than merely represent preexisting
realities and regulate behavior. Rather, culture is being seen as creating (social) reality,
whose existence rests partly on such cultural definitions. With this, cultural psychology
recognizes the open and indeterminate relationship between cultural meanings, practices
and material forces. It is recognized that not only social institutions (e.g. marriage, school),
roles (e.g. bride, student) and artifacts (e.g. wedding ring, lecture notes), but also
psychological concepts (e.g. the self, emotion, mind) and epistemological categories (e.g.
time) depend, in part, on cultural distinctions embodied in language categories, discourse,
and everyday social practices.
Self narratives
If we turn to just one psychological concept merely understood as an effort to conceptualize
something about human psychic functioning to the so-called self, we see these general
observations readily illustrated. Self is not a “thing” like other things we encounter in the
world, therefore the use of the definitive article “the” is inappropriate to refer to it; what is
referred to, in fact, is a dynamic human process, the nature of which is very hard to
conceptualize. Self is not a natural entity, no one is born with a self, a sense of self needs to
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develop, and whatever that self is, it varies in different contexts, also in the different
contexts that are the different phases of the individual life. How could any psychologist
have access to that self? How to do research on this process? How to take self into account
in psychotherapy, for instance? We need to realize that self is only given in language, and
therefore only accessible through language. It is in the speech, in the talking of the patient,
in her words, in her phrasing, in her metaphors, in her use of symbols, that self displays
itself. (Mind: I am not saying that self manifests itself in speech only; in many other forms
of human acting self may display itself too; but if we want to know what such acting means
to both the actor and her fellow human beings, we need to employ language again. For
psychologists, therefore, self is only accessible in speech and other linguistic activities or
their results.) It is not only in actually talking that self reveals itself. It is only detectible in
the narratives that have been kept in the form of answers to open questions in
questionnaires, in records of interviews or in all kinds of other linguistic materials
psychologists work with in empirical research. Also autobiographies are an example of
such material, and as is obvious, they have been employed in even the earliest empirical
investigations in the psychology of religion already.
We should be aware of the perspective of any psychological theory, of its specificity.
When psychology turns to self narratives like autobiographical texts, it does not do so to
examine the situations described in them or to reconstruct particular events or points in
time; such research, interesting as it may be, is usually left to historians. Nor does
psychology delve into the existent or nonexistent literary qualities of an autobiography, or
into the genre of autobiography as such; this is the realm of literary theorists. When
psychology avails itself of autobiographical texts, it does so by asking psychological
questions and from a psychological perspective. The most important argument for doing
this is usually that working with autobiographical texts, in whatever form (they certainly
need not be limited to published autobiographies but may include texts written at the
explicit request of the researcher, diaries and many other forms of autobiographical data; cf.
Bruner 1990, for example), is the most effective way of gathering information for certain
kinds of questioning. If the researcher is interested in studying the development of
someone’s identity, for example, hardly a better method can be devised than to ask the
research participant to provide at regular intervals a text that is as subjective and personal as
possible. Even when psychologists look at existing autobiographies, published or not, they
do so in order to find answers to systematic psychological questions concerning such
factors as psycho-social development, parent-child binding and social relationships in
general, guilt and shame, experience of sexuality, mental disorder and many others. For the
psychologist who is interested in religion, autobiographical texts may provide a great deal
of information concerning the development of individual religiosity and the influence that
certain forms of religion can have on the development of the personality.
Autobiographies can also serve as an important source of information for research on
that which psychologists call “self,” since it is in an autobiography that an author presents
herself. She presents herself in a certain way, telling us a story about herself and her life. In
doing so the author usually draws an ideal picture of herself. Although the story itself need
not be ideal in any way (and the author may be reporting it with quite a bit of shame), he
paints a picture of himself, which he hopes the listener or reader will accept and endorse.
The particular self narrative or autobiography a counselor or therapist needs to interpret
may be that, what the patient is telling right now, it may be the story written on request of
counselor, it may even be a published autobiography. One can employ several forms of
psychology in order to interpret it; in a context of counseling or psychotherapy, it will
typically be a form of psychology relevant to issues of mental health. But before going
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shortly into that, let me try to take away any misunderstandings the above may give rise to
already. For often the first reaction to idea of the autobiography as presentation of the self,
and to the self as a narrative construction, is that of shock. Does this mean that a person’s
self or identity is “only” a story? Wouldn’t it be possible then for someone to tell any
manner of story about herself? People tell many different stories throughout their lives, and
they also tell different versions to different listeners. If all those stories are what the self, or
the selves, of a particular person are, where is the unity of that person? Let’s deal briefly
with these questions and get a bit more formally theoretical now.
Self as a concept of psychology
Self is fundamentally characterized, even constituted, by language and story. For the
development and functioning of human self-awareness—regarded by many theoreticians, in
line with Hegel, as precisely that which distinguishes the human being from the animal—
language is of vital importance. Self-awareness, says Kojève (1947, pp. 163–168),
presupposes that the human being, by using the personal pronoun “I,” is able to locate
himself as distinct from the world of objects and even from himself. So according to Kojève
there is an intrinsic connection between self-awareness and language: in fact, there can be
no self-awareness without language. The psychoanalyst Lacan (1966) would later speak of
the “birth of the subject,” referring to the process by which the child enters the symbolic
order and in particular learns to handle and to conform to the language he encounters in his
subculture. In order to speak about herself, a person must have developed the ability to
objectify, which she does thanks to language. So language is a precondition that makes
subjectivity possible, and not the other way round. There is not an essential subject who
desires to make use of language; rather, the constitution of the subject presupposes
language (Haute 1993, pp. 165–167). When the subject, once constituted by language,
wants to know something or share something about herself, she must avail herself of
language if she is to tell herself or others who she is; she must make an announcement
concerning who she has become up to that point. “Up to that point”—for the human being
is an historical creature: her life, between birth and death, is a history. That history can be
expressed in different places and different ways. It can be imparted in the form of a story. If
people are asked to indicate who they are, they will answer with some kind of life history.
Indeed, human transience can only be expressed linguistically. To specify this linguistic
structure, Ricoeur (1981, pp. 169–172) uses the term “narrativity.” Man has a narrative
structure by virtue of his historicity: he must relate history, especially his own history
(Zwaal 1997, p. 100). This makes the self not only a product of the past but also an
interpretation of the past.
In developing her own notion of herself, woman must rely on the stories that are passed
on to her and that are absorbed by her, as it were, during socialization. Each story about
ourselves is always already embedded in the continuing story of a particular cultural
history. The possibilities for self-comprehension that we acquire and develop are
themselves always products of a particular historical tradition that makes us its product
(Heidegger 1927). Such stories, which inhabit and form our lives and make them possible,
are first of all the stories that constitute the background of every notion within a certain
culture. They are embodied not only in our views of humankind, the world and life itself
but also in art forms and rituals that are shared by all the participants in that particular
culture. They are the archetypal stories from every culture, and we run across them in
metaphors and expressions, films and plays, but also in functional symbols such as a cross
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or crucifix, the V-for-victory sign, in monuments and in symbols that are associated with
commemorations as well as with holidays and festivals (Guignon 1998, p. 569). These are
the stories that impart structure to the ordinary, mundane stories we experience and indulge
in every day and give them meaning by making available a certain horizon of
comprehension. Naturally such archetypal stories differ from culture to culture (and
subculture to subculture). The optimistic stories about the redemptive self from the United
States (McAdams 2006) are very different from those about sacrifice and suffering that the
Russians grow up with, and both are quite distinct from the archetypal stories about ritual
suicide such as those making the rounds in Japan. Such fundamental differences can make
the life patterns of one culture or subculture seem pointless in the eyes of another (just think
of how the forms of Roman Catholic monastic life are perceived by certain Protestants).
Second, the impact of stories can be found in the ordinary, everyday way that people
communicate with each other. Whenever we engage in an ordinary conversation, we
structure our stories according to the storytelling standard that is or is becoming generally
accepted within our culture. In doing so, we often use narrative cues that inform the listener
as to the kind of story she is about to hear. (An opening sentence such as “Once upon a
time” calls for an entirely different kind of comprehension than “What rotten luck I had
yesterday.”) So we are very far from being able to tell any random story about ourselves (or
even to consciously construct such a story); indeed, the ways in which the self can be
articulated is subject to strict limitations that usually remain implicit. While language and
story make the self possible, they also determine its limits.
Examples of psychological theories
In narrative psychology, such as that introduced by Sarbin and others (Sarbin 1986a, 1986b,
1993; Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994; Sarbin and Scheibe 1983), these notions are expanded to
cover broader parts of psychic functioning than self alone. In one programmatic text, “The
narrative as a root metaphor for psychology,” Sarbin (1986a) introduces the “narratory
principle”: “human beings think, perceive, imagine and make moral choices according to
narrative structures” (p. 8). He sees emotions, for example, as inextricable from their social
context. In his analysis he uses the image of a scene with many individuals in which the action
of one participant functions as the focus for the following actions that are carried out by the
person himself as well as by the other participants. (So emotions should never be studied as
events that happen within a single individual.) According to narrative psychologists, however,
it is not only emotions that are led by narrative plots; actions are, too. In listening to and
telling stories there is an involvement in the actors and their adventures. Action is not only
present in the story, however; it also follows from the story. The so-called Don Quixote
principle states that people act in order to extend the plot of a particular story, especially when
they imagine themselves to be the protagonist of that story. The Don Quixote principle refers
to the practice of shaping one’s identity by emulating stories. The central idea is that the
narratives with which the cultural participants have become acquainted go on to determine
their actions: they provide the characters, ideas, settings, instruments and procedures that
individuals and groups can use to give shape to their own activities.
The narrative approach directs attention to the interface between individual and
collective functioning, and is therefore particularly relevant for cultural psychology, also
in its application to religion. Narrative psychology is an attempt to understand human
functioning as culturally located: no matter what emotion or form of activity a person is
about to display, it is seen as dependent on the stories, the plots and the roles from the
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culture or subculture in which the person grew up and in which she now happens to be
functioning. Because there are always others present in the current situation, real or imagined,
every act is an interactive occurrence, always directed at one or more others. And at different
times and places the person will present versions of himself that deviate from each other to a
greater or lesser extent. (Thus a life companion will be shown a self that is different and
probably more private than a colleague, etc.) But no matter what stories are told about the self,
they will all follow existing plots. For this reason, Hermans and Kempen (1993)—by analogy
with Bakhtin (1929) and using the terminology of James (1890) and Mead (1934)—present
the self as a polyphonic novel: a person standing in a multiplicity of worlds in which a story
about a “me” with an accompanying “I” can and must be told, over and over again. Those
stories can be relatively independent of each other (and sometimes even contrary to each
other) and the I’s of the different stories can even communicate with each other within the
same self. There are different worlds with different stories told by different I’s, but there is no
overarching I that organises and/or coordinates the different me’s. So the self is not one and
undivided, not always and everywhere the same; it is plural and context-dependent, a
decentralised multiplicity of I positions that function in dialogue like relatively independent
authors. That is: they tell each other stories about their respective me’s as actors.
According to an even older tenet of literary theory, every text—and therefore also the
articulation of a self at a particular time and place—is a result of relations between texts, a product
of intertextuality, a membrane into which elements are woven that had already been produced
elsewhere in discontinuous form (cf. Sprinker 1980). So the dialogicity of the self presupposes
much more than a conversation with whomever is present in the here and now, whether
through direct eye contact or not. The articulation of the self, as it emerges at a certain time and
place, does not sound like just one single voice; in such an articulation the resonances of other
voices can be heard: the voices of the parents and significant others as well as the voices of
collectives such as a social class, a professional group or a religious tradition. It is especially
the social voices, such as those alluded to by Bakhtin (1929), that have influence on what a
person says, that determine what she can say in the first place, usually without being conscious
of the fact. There are many personal, unique voices in the self, but there are also a number—
perhaps a far greater number—of collective voices. So to repeat: people cannot tell any random
story they choose in order to articulate who they are. The stories they tell, the meanings they
construct and the sense they impart are dependent on the interplay of various voices.
Still other forms of psychology that are quite different from the possibly obvious
narrative psychology offer other points of view that might be relevant in a study of a
person’s own life story. Ideally, one should try to combine quite diverse forms of
psychology to interpret a particular self narrative. Psychology at large is a very
heterogeneous enterprise, with many differing approaches, that sometimes even seem to
contradict one another. In my opinion, this is no problem at all: reality, also the life of one
particular individual, will always be richer than what any form of scholarship will have to
say about it. To understand another person, psychologists will, by necessity, have to employ
very diverse forms of insights and research techniques.
The psychologies of the self: A plurality applicable to the study of religiosity
Obviously, all of this also counts when one is interested in religion or religiosity, either as a
psychologist setting out to do research or as a counselor or psychotherapist in a clinical
situation, working with actual persons, with “living human documents,” as Boisen coined a
phrase so nicely. We might wonder whether and to what extent someone’s story could
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provide insight into a possible relationship between religion and psychic functioning. With
this question in mind, we take up one of the oldest research traditions in the psychology of
religion. The more specific question concerning the relationship between religion and
mental health has always been a prominent one in psychology of religion, and not only
because of its presumed social relevance. Even the founding fathers of the field of
psychology dealt with religion in terms of “healthy mindedness,” “the sick soul,” and “the
divided self” (James 1902/2002) and made methodical comparisons between religious
rituals and obsessional neurosis (Freud 1907). The animosity between psychologists and
representatives of religious organizations has sometimes been bitter, but after more than a
century of research and formulation of theories a consensus seems to have been arrived at:
it is almost impossible to make general statements. Religion may be 1) an expression of
mental disorder, 2) a socializing and oppressive force, helping people cope with their life
stresses and mental aberrations, 3) a protective agent for some mentally disturbed persons,
4) a therapy, 5) a hazard (Spilka et al. 2003). The relationship between religion and mental
health can thus be structured in a variety of ways, and in any individual case it is good to
consider what type of connection is at work. One interesting example is a clinical case I
have been working on myself (Belzen 2004): the case of an autobiography in which the “I”
person tells how she was cured of a serious depression thanks to “religion” (a term that is
far too broad and requires a more detailed explanation) but who was turned away by the
very religious communities she wished to serve. The reasons for this rejection are certainly
relevant but are not fundamental for the psychologist: her primary interest will be what
motivated the author to write an autobiography and what psychic functions were involved,
and among her questions will be those concerning the connection between religiosity and
psychic functioning. I shall not go into this case any further here, however. In order to
avoid making the impression of being one-sided, or to have left the domain of traditional
psychology, I want to remind again of the many, vary different types of psychological
theory, also about self.
Next to these contextualizing perspectives, there are a great number of psychological
approaches that have their focus on the development of the person within a certain context,
on the history of individual subjectivity. So-called psychodynamic theories typically belong
to these approaches. It is another set of questions, about the same person, that may be asked
utilizing such theories. To illuminate the difference between these approaches, let me give
an obvious and probably recognizable example, drawing on the case I have been studying:
A patient may paint herself as someone “special,” as someone who, after a difficult
childhood, managed by dint of hard work to become a successful businesswoman, and who,
while still quite young, retired from her business to live from her private means like a
woman of rank, moving in the better circles. She may paint herself as someone who, after
undergoing the requisite hardships in life, is blessed by God, someone who has special
experiences with God and has been chosen by him to be his instrument in this world. She
may present herself as someone who has a story to tell, a story that is so worthwhile that it
should be heard by as many people as possible because they stand to profit from it. As
psychologists, we may rightly ask ourselves what this tone means, what it refers to or what
caused it. The identity presented in this way is—as with every presentation of the self—a
desired identity, and it exhibits all the standard problems that are part of the concept of
identity. Identity as a narrative given is a text that obscures its own meaning, a meaning of
longings that the author does not and usually cannot recognize (Ricoeur 1970). So
psychoanalysts such as Lacan point to the problematic status of the identity. According to
Lacan, identity is a construct realized in the realm of reality that he called the “imaginary”
and is followed by doubt and by suspicions concerning one’s own understanding of self,
Pastoral Psychol (2010) 59:399–409 405
while at the same time it is also the desperate antidote against internal fragmentation,
conflictual longing and threatening chaos (Rosenberg et al. 1992, pp. 41–42). So one may
well inquire whether there may have been inner needs in someone’s life that cause her to
talk, and perhaps to write, as she does (or did).
Psychoanalytical perspectives can be worthwhile when used as heuristics and one could
try to use some of them as a complement to insights gained from working with approaches
like narrative psychology discussed so far. One particular psychoanalytic theory also goes
by the name of “self psychology,” and was developed by Heinz Kohut. (Of course, utilizing
the same word “self” Kohut does not refer to exactly the same entity as e.g. James, Mead or
Sarbin.) According to Kohut, self comes into being through the sufficient, empathic
mirroring of the child by the mother (or another primary caregiver; for the sake of
convenience, however, we will continue to speak of the mother). The process by which the
neonate becomes conscious of the separation from the mother is by its very nature difficult:
the child must begin to realize that an outside world exists which is not subject to his
wishes, and that the mother is not always available to him. For the neonate, who must rely
on others for his survival, there is something life threatening about this situation: if no one
were to respond to his need for care, he would die. The child responds to this frustrating
perception with the development of a certain hallucinatory desire, by which he tries to
preserve the unity and completeness that have been lost. On the one hand he develops a
grandiose image of himself (based on what has now become an aphorism: “I am perfect”),
and on the other hand he forms the image of an almighty other, an idealised parent imago
who is assigned to serve as guarantor of care and protection (“you are perfect, but I am part
of you,” Kohut 1971, p. 27). (According to Kohut this takes place among children between
the ages of about 8 months and 3 years.) If the parent relates to the child with empathy, she
thereby fulfils two functions that are necessary for the child: on the one hand by accepting
the child’s grandiose image of itself, by admiring the child and making him feel that he is
indeed very special, and on the other hand by making herself available as an object of
admiration. (In this way parents fulfill the so-called self-object function: they function as
the first self-objects for the child.) What matters is not so much what the parents do as how
they are: it is the quality of the interaction with the parents that is internalized by the child.
If the parents fall short in this regard, the child will not be able to develop a normal, healthy
“sense of self.” He will continue to have doubts about himself and his self-worth, precisely
because he was not mirrored, or not enough. He will have to go through life without a
sufficiently crystallized sense of being “allowed to exist,” of being “good enough,” a
feeling he can fall back on when he meets with adversity in life and from which he can
continue to derive self-worth even in the face of failure. It is inevitable, however, that
parents will not always respond fully to the needs of the child. According to Kohut that is
neither necessary nor even desirable. By means of all sorts of small but non-traumatic
frustrations, what he calls “transmuting internalization” can take place by which both
necessary functions are gradually disconnected from the parents and absorbed into the self.
The grandiose image of the self thereby becomes more realistic: from exhibitionistic
narcissism it becomes the “fuel for our ego-syntonic ambitions and purposes, for the
enjoyment of our activities, and for important aspects of our self-esteem” (Kohut 1971, pp.
27–28). In the same way, the idealized parent imago is transformed into ideals to be
pursued. The “grandiose self,” the image of the self as grandiose,1 is the first to become part
of the nuclear self. This takes place between about the second and fourth years (Kohut
1 This is an example of Kohut’s often inconsistent use of language: he uses the same word to refer to the
image of the self as grandiose (“self”) as to the self of which this image is a part.
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1977, p. 178). This self is mainly derived from the relationship with the mother. The
“idealized parent imago” forms between the fourth and sixth years, during the Oedipal
phase, and is derived from the relationship with both parents.
If the development of the child involves more than the “normal” traumatization (too
difficult or too frequent experiences of a lack of empathic response, for example, or of
divorce, disappointment and the like), the transformation of the two images (the self and the
parent) will not occur; in such a situation they do not become integrated but continue to
exist independently. If the grandiose self is traumatized in the midst of its development, the
exhibitionistic narcissistic energy will not be able to reinvest itself in the grandiose self in
modified form and the subject will ultimately be bereft of an adequate sense of self-esteem.
If the idealizing narcissistic energy is traumatically disappointed in experiences with the
idealized object it will revert to the idealized parent imago, thus depriving the subject’s
ideals of an adequate energy supply. Both images then retain psychic energy in repressed
form or in a form that is separated from more realistic images; they will distort the
development of the subject and prevent the later adult from acting and/or experiencing in a
realistic way. The adult—each in his own way, of course, and to varying degrees—will
remain tied to his (unconscious) delusions of grandeur and will act as if he were the center
of the universe or will withdraw from everything because he is afraid that his extreme
expectations will be disappointed. Or he will remain tied to the idealized parent imago and
may spend his whole life looking for a parent substitute to which he can submit and with
which he can identify, thereby sharing in the substitute’s greatness but unable to stand on
his own two feet. And if the expectations of such non-integrated self and object images are
too badly disappointed, the adult may simply withdraw into the very early sub-
representatives of self and object. His self and his world will then fall apart and fragment
and the person will go insane (Pietzcker 1983, pp. 45–46). Usually things do not go this far,
however. In most cases such a psychic decompensation does not occur, and the
narcissistically vulnerable person is still able to do an excellent job of presenting an image
of himself to the outside world as adjusted and even successful, although often at great
psychic expense. And here it should be noted once again that narcissism and its expressions
need not be pathological as such. If transformed, the pole of the self known as the
“grandiose self” will supply the energy that the I needs for its activities. And the idealizing
narcissism, in its transformed form, will make possible such socially valued faculties as
creativity, empathy, the ability to face one’s own finiteness, humor and wisdom (Kohut
1966/1985, p. 111).
Final words
If we utilize a theory like Kohut’s, we will be able to ask different questions, questions that
may help us to interpret the story a particular person told us, questions that may enable us to
help a patient. It is impossible to go further into practical consequences here. Let me finish
by reiterating how important culture and context are for psychic functioning: in order to
understand another person, we must pay attention to her context, we must know about the
subcultural reality that has brought about the particular story we are confronted with. A
religious story is the result of the person being embedded in a religious subculture, no
single person invents a religion herself, in order to understand what another person is telling
us religiously, we must be acquainted with the religious tradition she is speaking from. This
stance requires great modesty from the individual counselor or psychotherapist: she should
not think she could deal with all and each type of religion! She will often have to consult
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with experts on religious traditions unknown to herself, she will have to be careful not to
remain stuck in stereotypes about religious traditions she may think to be acquainted with,
she should perhaps transfer a patient to a colleague with a better knowledge of a religious
tradition than she disposes of. Having drawn on a psychoanalytic theory that used the study
of different types of transference as its main focus of empirical inquiry, I should perhaps
express a last warning: even if a counselor is acquainted with the type of spirituality the
patient is speaking from or relating to, this does not necessarily mean that the counselor is
able to handle the issues of religion and/or spirituality well in the clinical context. All kinds
of problems with countertransference may play a role, not in the least place the counselor’s
desire to work with the patient’s religious self. In general, and perhaps contrary to what an
increasing number of especially evangelical-Christian psychotherapists in the USA seem to
think, it should be recommended not to do so: it comes close to instrumentalizing
spirituality. For pastoral counselors doing so may an entry for action, but even they should
realize how complicated the concept of the self, whether religious or not, is, as I hoped this
paper has started to make aware of.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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